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This article has been developed from a PhD thesis defended at the University of Zagreb in 2016 under the title "Politics of National Identity. Cases of Spanish and French Basque Country".
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The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect the views of the author's employer, The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia.
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For the purpose of this article, institutions of autonomy are defined as institutions of territorial autonomy. They are designed on the one hand, to accommodate the grievances of distinct ethno-linguistic groups, as is the cases of the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia in Spain, and Quebec in Canada. The latter are considered distinct "nacionalidades" under the Spanish Constitution of 1978, and possess a separate language, co-official with the Castillian Spanish. On the other hand, in other cases, these institutions are designed to accommodate the local/regional or historical specifics, as is the case of other Spanish Autonomous Communities, like Madrid, Murcia or Aragon, or other Canadian provinces, like Manitoba or Alberta. Of course, with the autonomy, the state grants to autonomous institutions not only a high level of cultural/linguistic autonomy, but also devolves a high degree of state powers in many areas. The autonomous communities are also endowed with representative and state-like (in symbolic and real terms) institutions, like a local Parliament, prime minister, Government, police, etc. Thus the Autonomous Communities of the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia in Spain, and Quebec in Canada, become a "segment-state" or "proto-nation-state" (Roeder 2007; or "state-in-the-making" (Bunce 1999) for their respective ethnic groups. We can talk here, at least partially (in the mentioned three cases of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, and Quebec in Canada) about "ethno-federalism". One has to bear in mind that Spain is officially not a federation, but another term is used, "Estado Autonómico" (Autonomous State, State of Autonomies).
Valerie Bunce and "subversive institutions"
In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic
Western European countries -from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) -has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states also have, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes.
From the unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way that has resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities achieved a certain degree and institutions of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution"),
as in the case of Scotland, to the extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator was, among other political reasons, to safeguard state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites.
The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to the initial intentions.
In the newly formed administrative units, the "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this paper is to try to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship between autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the question whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories will be examined. In this paper, although several examples will be mentioned, the focus will be on Basque Country, where stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism have been noted in its Spanish part, whereas they are almost non-existent in its French part. It seems to be a good example of a mini case study of most similar systems (Przeworski and Teune 1970) , in order to test the hypothesis about the institutions of autonomy being "subversive institutions".
The research relies on Valerie Bunce's theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations of the Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR), and Yugoslavia (SRFY).
Her theory has been applied on Spain and its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías, being in a way and maybe to a lesser extent similar to the former republics of the exsocialist federations, provide a kind of framework of a proto-state, a nation-state, a "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism. Spanish Basque Country, Autonomous Community País Vasco-Euskadi, enjoys many prerogatives and symbols of a state.
For example, its language enjoys the status of the official language of the local administration, together with (Castilian) Spanish. It has its own administration, which develops even its own paradiplomacy (Lecours 2005 ) and its own police force, the Ertzaintza. It has a comprehensive network of educational and cultural institutions which cherish and foster the Basque language, culture, and national spirit. It possesses a wide range of local social and economic institutions. Finally, its own Parliament develops a regional ("autonomous") party system and fosters party competition -including in local patriotism and nationalism. All this influences the development of identity, not only cultural, but also political, and strengthens the local nationalism and secessionism.
Valerie Bunce, explaining the collapse of former communist federations of the USSR, CSFR, and SFRY, subscribes to the thesis that "the very structure of the bloc and the federation put into place the necessary conditions for the rise of nations and nationalist movements in the peripheral units" (Bunce 1999: 39) , and their design created the preconditions for creating states within the state and "nation-states at the republican level" (ibid 54). Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations of the USSR, CSFR, and SFRY.
...recognizing, or in some cases, creating a common language, by expanding education, by building a nationally defined intelligentsia, by developing at the republican level a stable core of economic, representational, coercive, social, and cultural institutions, each of which was led by powerful, durable, and "nativized" elite cadres: by providing considerable economic and political resources to these republican elites; and by enclosing all of these developments within well-defined geographical and administrative perimeters... (Bunce 1999: 49) .
Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", strengthened them. "Institutions and policies of federal socialist states were important in developing individual national identity... collective identity we associate with the 'nation'" (ibid: 48). Federalism created "states-in-the-making, complete with their own borders, elites, national communities, and a full array of economic, political, social, and cultural institutions" (ibid: 84-85).
"Regional party elites fought for their survival by distancing themselves and their republics from the centre through...combinations of nationalism"
(ibid: 87). In other words, the federal structures where the autonomous/ federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy in the long term acted centrifugally, which finally led to the collapse of the states (federations).
With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, the consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and the array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of the federations, the federal units -the new "nations-in-the-making" -took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.
As mentioned above, Bunce's theory and arguments will first be applied to the situation in Spain; it will then be compared with the situation in France in order to test our hypothesis. In France, due to a different, centralized state structure and civic state, only recently loosened by a mild regionalization,
there is no such phenomenon of "subversive institutions". In that respect, the differences between the French and Spanish Basque Country will be observed, bearing in mind the relatively strong Basque nationalism and some forms of secessionism in the Spanish Basque Country, while in the French Basque Country their absence has been noticed.
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The other authors who have tackled or further elaborated the theory of subversive institutions will also be mentioned in the paper and their ideas grouped into three main arguments. The theory will be exposed to criticism and a short case study will be added in order to apply the theory and test the hypothesis on concrete examples. Finally, a short summary of the main ideas brought forth in the paper will be given.
The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features, and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country, is held responsible for the different outcome (nationalism/secessionism).
the central state is weakened, but also that the politicians are trapped between the two dangers -centralization on the one side, and further devolution, which may lead to dissolution, on the other. Fighting against one, they shift into another, while the society becomes polarized in a zerosum game.
Secessionism does not appear necessarily, at least not in its extreme variant, in all cases of state transformation, devolution, and decentralization on a federal basis. Primarily it appears where there exist minorities with a welldefined national identity (Balcells et al. 2012) , as in the case of the Basque Country or Catalonia. Of course, one may argue whether the acquired autonomy resulted in secessionism or the whether the latter impulse had existed before and the regions acquired autonomy in an attempt to preserve the common state. Thus, the autonomy did not accommodate and mitigate nationalism, but rather gave it a further disintegrative push, while in some areas or cases it created it from scratch.
There are of course other factors that make autonomous institutions develop a "subversive" character, apart from the institutional design itself, which some authors do not consider responsible for secessionism per se (Giuliano 2006 there exists a "core", "dominant" region (Hale 2004; Erk and Anderson 2009 ), which will be discussed later. Nevertheless, there is a whole range of literature that supports our argument, that is, the theory of subversive institutions.
One can argue that the institutions of autonomy become "subversive" in several ways. Through the institution-building process, the autonomous region gains the institutions and symbols of a proto-state by which it strengthens and nurtures local nationalism and secessionism, and facilitates a potential secession. By means of these institutions and by using the cleavages of "official nationalism" (Anderson 1990 ), 5 a subnational 5 Phenomena of "state patriotism" or "state nationalism" (Hobsbawm 1993 : 91, 94, 101), or "official nationalism" (Anderson 1990 : 77-100) appeared during the 17th and 18th centuries when following the revolutions (UK (Cromwell), identity different from the state one is built, while the formation of a local parliament not only allows the attributes of statehood, but it also provides an arena for party competition at a regional level, which additionally stimulates nationalism and secessionism. Albeit, all these phenomena are interlinked and cannot easily be detached from one another; for the sake of simplicity, three arguments within the theory of subversive institutions will be developed: institution building, identity building, and elite building, the latter including party competition.
Argument 1 -Institution building, "state-in-waiting"
Devolution, that is, the transfer of power from the central to the regional level, empowers the region with the representative institutions aspiring to represent their region, and in the case of a multinational state, a nominal minority nation. Autonomy provides them with "many features of state…banners, leaders,…schools and political systems" (Greer 2007: 8) .
Some authors explain the stronger presence of secessionist movements in decentralized states like Spain or the United Kingdom by the level of transferred power. Especially, as has been demonstrated by the example of Scotland, where the process of devolution stimulated a nationalism and secessionism that almost had not existed before. An autonomous region has defined borders within which it can hold a referendum on independence (plebiscite); its institutions can serve as a "state-in-the-making" (Bunce 1999: 84) , so the autonomy can often be regarded as a "first step" towards independence (Balcells et al. 2012: 12) . Martinez-Herrera (2008) found that in the cases examined, secessionism has increased after decentralization because, among other reasons, the nationalist "entrepreneurs" use the new existing opportunities offered by the institutions of autonomy, and can "spread their message more effectively" (6), on account of the fact that "institutions raise the capacity of groups to act" (Cornell 2002: 15-16 ).
As mentioned above, the existence of autonomy had an important role Netherlands, US War of Independence, France) the dynastic principle was delegitimized. Monarchs, in search of a new source of legitimacy for their power, created a cult of the nation, which they represented and incorporated. With the passage of time, especially with the general progress and wide societal changes, the introduction of general conscription, general education, the strengthening of the state administration and press, followed by other media, state or official nationalism spreads. It spreads by help of the state and its institutions, the media under its control, through children raised in the patriotic spirit. A nation is built.
in the breakup of the former communist federations the USSR, CSFR, and SFRY (Bunce 1999; Duerr 2009 ), but also in ethnic conflicts that have not led to the breakup of states, like in the cases of the autonomous republics of the ex-USSR (Cornell 2002 ).
Ezgi (2010) also argues that the institutions of autonomy can increase secessionism, particularly where the causes 6 of the grievances of the minority population are of a symbolic nature. Not only does the minority find the autonomy dissatisfactory, but the autonomy also facilitates the secession, providing capacity for it. It acts, therefore, as a "subversive institution". Federalism acts as an administrative capacity building instrument for a potentially secessionist region. The regional government has an authority over the territory, which corresponds to the territory of a potential new state -that is, it has more or less established borders.
With the regional government, the local population "learns" to govern and organize its own administration (for its potentially independent state).
A federal state actually offers the "opportunity structure for peripheral nationalism" and a possibility to build up the administrative apparatus of a nucleus, a proto-state of a potential independent state (Mansvelt Beck 2005: 70, 76, 176) . Consequently, in case of secession, the new "nationstate" already has control over state institutions, which diminishes the costs of state building and makes secession less costly, and, as a result, more attractive (Ezgi 2010: 7-10) . Therefore Bunce (1999) There are also quantitative researches that confirm the theory of subversive institutions. For example, states where an ethnic minority represents a third of the population, if it is unitary, have only an 8.9% probability of experiencing conflict, but this percentage rises to high 50.3% if they are symmetric federations, and an alarming 95.3% in the case of asymmetric federations (Roeder n.d.: 30, 32) . In federal states there are 6 The causes of the grievances of the minority population, after Ezgi, can be tangible or symbolic. If they are tangible, concrete, of financial or material nature, but also of political and cultural nature, that is, if the minority complains of the economic stagnation or exploitation, political underrepresentation, cultural assimilation and so on, its grievances can be relatively easily accommodated by economic federalism and financial concessions, e.g. higher money transfers, cultural and political autonomy, etc. If, however, the causes of the grievances of the local population, or ethnic minority are of a symbolic, identity-based nature, where the minority simply wants its state, independence, state symbols, like the flag, anthem, membership in international organizations or football team at the World Championship, then federalism and concessions from the central state simply cannot satisfy it (Ezgi 2010:1-11).
statistically considerably more secessionist acts, and with the existing level of autonomy (such as administrative, executive, legislative capacities and two chamber parliament), each additional element of autonomy increases the preference for secession. That is, the more a region has autonomy, the higher the probability of secessionism (Ezgi 2010: 12-23 ).
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Argument 2 -Identity building Decentralization and regional governments create and strengthen regional identities by means of education, culture and the media, which are instruments of nation-building and a way of spreading a national idea, "building identification with the political community" (Martinez-Herrera 2008: 10). As the competences in these areas pass from the central state to regional institutions, the latter are now in a position to form a political community different from the state one. Autonomous regions thereby acquire "instruments for promoting ethnic identity" (Cornell 2002: 17) .
For instance, governments and parliaments can enact acts and laws on special protection of the minority language through education and the media, etc. 8 Exactly this process has been followed in the Spanish Basque
Country, and has been absent in the French part of Basque Country.
Not only does the autonomy "help maintain a distinct group identity" (Balcells et al. 2012: 5) , but it also "projects political aspirations of sub-state communities" (Moreno 2006: 16; Padjen 1991) Euskera, 1999 , etc. 9 Tomaić (2012 shows how autonomy and regionalism can lead to the creation of new, regional identities, in this case, an Istrian one, promoted by the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS), by which not only they strengthened regionalism, but indirectly also secessionism.
of arms, anthem, historical memories, founding fathers or father of the "nation", even the language specifics, even though they speak the same, Castilian Spanish language (Ruggiu 2012 ).
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Argument 3 -Elite building
Autonomy fosters the creation of a regional party system, a local media system, and local leaders that promote the nationalist message (Balcells et al. 2012: 3-7) . Of course, with local parliaments, parties, and leaders, not only does it enable, but it also fosters elite building, as well Interesting enough, following Catalonia, which had had its own historic continuity and statehood, as well as language and cultural specifics, other autonomous communities (regions) started constructing their own symbols. E.g. Castile-Leon, the cradle of Castilian Spanish language, having no separate language as Catalonia, stresses the fact it is the place where Castilian Spanish was born. Andalusia, on the other hand, stresses its own accent of Castilian Spanish, and its origins in flamenco. Moreover, it claims a kind of "ownership" over it (Ruggiu 2012: 21-22 ).
11 Brancati, in his research, uses data from 30 states, from the period 1985-2000, and comes to interesting conclusions. Decentralization diminishes ethnic conflict, but on the other hand, regionalist parties increase it, and we have to take into account their interaction. Consequently, his research shows that decentralization diminishes conflicts, if the regional parties are weak, but increases them ("subversive character"), if the parties are strong (2006: 675).
The above-mentioned avalanche of regionalism and regional identity constructions, which has happened recently in Spain, has been partially caused by political and party competitions reasons, in order to legitimize the local elites (Ruggiu 2012) . Party competition, appeared as a result of the existence of the "autonomous" institutions (parliaments), facilitated the collapse of former communist federations (Padjen 1991: 44 ; see also Giuliano 2006 ). In the case of Scotland, for instance, the party competition preceded and brought about Scottish autonomy, and later, as elsewhere, contributed to an increase in secessionist sentiment (Erk and Anderson 2009: 199-201 ).
Critique and limitations of the theory of "subversive institutions"
Institutions of autonomy get a "subversive" character when certain conditions have been met, but we can never take into consideration all the possible situations and conditions of the examined societal phenomena. Otherwise, we would face a classical problem of "too few cases/too many variables" (Peters 1998; Lijphart 1971; Goggin 1986) . Therefore, only some of the noticed limitations of our hypothesis (the theory of subversive institutions), which are the most important for the arguments of this paper, will be mentioned; namely, to what extent the institutions of autonomy will indeed act as "subversive"
and lead to stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism.
The first precondition for the secession of autonomous (federal) units is of course the existence of a strong distinct identity of the ethnic community.
Some authors mention the issue of immigration, which induces a sense of threat and xenophobia among the minority population, and fosters secessionism as an attempt to respond to the identity loss and to the societal implications that immigration brings along (Conversi 2000a; Mansvelt Beck 2005) . On the other hand, partially as a consequence of immigration and of the mixing of the population, and partially as a result of the process of the nation-building at the state (federal) level, a problem of a dual, mixed, split or overlapping identity has been observed. It appears in multinational states, where the population of the region feels, up to a certain extent, loyalty and allegiance towards two homelands -the local homeland, that is, to the region, and the wider homeland that the state represents, the country of which the region is a part. In the case of to the Spanish budget is 6,24%, while its GDP was 6,21% of the Spanish one in 2014, but its population is only 4,65%. It "pays according to its revenue, but receives according to its population", which means that Euskadi is "overcontributing almost 33%" (sobreaportación) (Álvarez, 2013) .
Also, the richness entails more immigration from other regions, which in Finally, we should not neglect the actors, elites, and leaders, i.e. the relation between structure and agency. The successful, competent, and charismatic leader (of a minority or of a regional government) can compensate for and overcome the institutional vacuum. Conversely, an
12 As a consequence, however, a collateral, undesired effect of the rise of (other) regionalism(s) and of (other) regional identities in Spain has come out of it, which could also have a "subversive influence". Thus there is an ironic inversion of intentions, where the central authorities, in order to diminish the "subversiveness" of Basque and Catalan nationalism, fosters regionalism and subsequently, "subversive institutions" in other parts of Spain.
incompetent and uncharismatic leader will not be capable of taking full advantage of all the opportunities and authority that the existing institutions offer him/her.
Case study -Spanish and French Basque Country Introduction
In this short case study, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French
Basque Country, and the most similar systems design will be used. The The most similar systems design is of course a useful tool and a way to compare the two cases, as well as to explore, in trying to prove, the causal mechanism between the independent variable (autonomy) and dependent variable (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism).
However, this dual comparison or binary analysis, a comparative study with only two cases, involves simplification and reduction, bringing about the famous problem of "Too Few Cases/Too Many Variables" to an extreme (Peters 1998; Lijphart 1971; Goggin 1986 In France, in contrast, there was no dictatorship. Therefore, no grievances were present that were so strong such as to lead to terrorism or mass protests to put pressure on the state to gain autonomy. The grievances of the French Basques, which were much weaker, had consequently weaker results -instead of full-fledged territorial autonomic institutions, and sovereignist/secessionist attempts.
The Case Study will follow the three arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, effects on institution or "segment-state" building, identity building and elite building. 18 E.g. the king, symbol of Spanish-Castilian domination, has been taken out from the traditional coat of arms of Guipuzcoa, which for that reason had to be changed (Mansvelt Beck 2005: 159) .
Argument 1 -Institution building
19
The content of certain schoolbooks … stimulate hatred of all that is Spanish" (Mansvelt Beck 2005: 160) .
20 The parallel use of two languages -Spanish and Basque -where Spanish has for been centuries dominating the public sphere and Basque has been mainly reduced to family and private life. Gellner uses the terms "high" and "low culture" (1998). As far as identity is concerned, 35% of the interviewees declare themselves as "only Basque", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish", and 3% "only Spanish" (Euskobarometro, Mayo 2015, grafico 26 Although the latter figure alone seems low as a proof of secessionism in the strict sense, the first two figures could be added if secessionism is regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism, autonomism and secessionism). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation building has maybe not yet finished, but it is well underway and there is a "Basque direction" to the Euskadi.
In the French Basque Country, even though it is more and more present in schools, society and public institutions, the Basque language still does not enjoy official status. The improvement in the linguistic situation owes only partially to the authorities. However, there is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after the 1980s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it via "dictate", as was the case in the Spanish Autonomous Community of Euskadi. Spanish Basque Country do. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basque", 5% "more Basque", 24% "equally Basque and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French" (Baxok et al. 2006 ). In the French Basque Country,
French identity and French language in education and in society prevail.
There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation building process.
Argument 3 -Elite building
In the at the level of the whole Autonomous Community, from the "autonomous"
22 PNV, the Basque Nationalist Party, Partido nacionalista vasco (in Basque language -EAJ, Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea) is the oldest and the strongest Basque political party. The moderate nationalist party of the centre-right. PNV, which defines itself as "Basque, democratic, participative, pluralistic, non-confessional and humanistic party, open to progress", talks about a "Basque nation, whose political being needs to be expressed by restauration of national sovereignty", and "considers Basque language (euskera) as Basque national language and requests that its normalisation be considered as national responsibility" (PNV website, www.eajpnv.eu). PNV won the elections for the first autonomous Basque Parliament in 1980 with 38,1% of the vote (Gobierno Vasco, Archivo resultados electorales). Ever since, apart from the period 2009-2012, PNV has been in power and formed the Basque Government, either in coalition, or alone. All of the Basque prime ministers (Lehendakari) since 1980, apart from the period of 2009-2012, were members of PNV. With the passage of time, PNV became a Basque catch-all party (Hague, Harrop, Breslin, 2001: 213) . In the current Basque Parliament (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) , PNV, with 34% of the the vote, holds 27 out of 75 seats (EITB, www.eitb.eus).
23 EH Bildu, the second largest Basque party, is actually a coalition of various leftist and radical parties and groups of Basque nationalists. It is "more nationalist" (sovereigntist or even secessionist) than the PNV. In the current Basque Parliament (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) Euskadi, bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, a "new Ibarretxe Plan" that might lead to a "velvet divorce" and an independent Basque Country, could become a reality.
To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1) nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders, and created the space and even the incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that is missing for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce 1999 ). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of, for example, the Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created.
Conclusion
The hypothesis that institutions of autonomy or federal institutions that The main arguments of our hypothesis are that, with the institutions of autonomy, the region gains the capacities of a potential (independent) state, which facilitates the process of (proto-) state-building in an administrative and political sense, and diminishes the costs of institution 
